Spatial evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game with three strategies and external constraints

Physics – Condensed Matter – Statistical Mechanics

Scientific paper

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11 pages, 12 figures

Scientific paper

10.1103/PhysRevE.62.1095

The emergence of mutual cooperation is studied in a spatially extended evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game in which the players are located on the sites of cubic lattices for dimensions d=1, 2, and 3. Each player can choose one of the three strategies: cooperation (C), defection (D) or Tit for Tat (T). During the evolutionary process the randomly chosen players adopt one of their neighboring strategies if the chosen neighbor has higher payoff. Morover, an external constraint imposes that the players always cooperate with probability p. The stationary state phase diagram are computed by both using generalized mean-field approximations and Monte Carlo simulations. Nonequilibrium second order phase transitions assosiated with the extinction of one of the possible strategies are found and the corresponding critical exponents belong to the directed percolation universality class. It is shown that forcing externally the collaboration does not always produce the desired result.

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