Dilemma game in a traffic model with the crossing

Details Dilemma game in a traffic model with the crossing Dilemma game in a traffic model with the crossing

2010-06-06

arxiv.org/abs/1006.1079v1

Physics

Physics and Society

8 figures

Scientific paper

In this paper, we investigate the non-signalized intersection issue considering traffic flow and energy dissipation in terms of game theory based on the Nagel-Schreckenberg (NaSch) model. There are two types of driver agents at the intersection when vehicles on the two streets are approaching to it simultaneously: C agents (cooperative strategy) pulling up to avoid collision and D agents (defective strategy) crossing the intersection audaciously. Phase diagram of the system, which describes free-flow phase, segregation phase, jammed phase and maximum current curve representing the social maximum payoff, is presented. Dilemma game is observed at the phase-segregated state except for the case of $v_{\max }=1.$

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