Unconditional security of key distribution from causality constraints

Details Unconditional security of key distribution from causality constraints Unconditional security of key distribution from causality constraints

2006-06-06

arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0606049v4

Physics

Quantum Physics

12 pages, 2 figure

Scientific paper

We analyze a protocol which generates secret key from correlations that violate a Bell inequality by a sufficient amount, and prove its security against eavesdroppers which are only constrained by the fact that any information accessible to them must be compatible with the impossibility of arbitrarily fast signaling. We prove unconditional security according to the strongest notion, the so called universally-composable security. The no-signaling assumption is imposed at the level of the outcome probabilities given the choice of the observable, therefore, the protocol remains secure in situations where the honest parties do not have a complete control over their quantum apparatuses, or distrust them. The techniques developed are very general and can be applied to other Bell inequality-based protocols. In particular, we provide a scheme for estimating Bell-inequality violations when the samples are not independent and identically distributed.

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