Biology – Quantitative Biology – Populations and Evolution
Scientific paper
2008-09-17
Journal of Theoretical Biology 257, 340 (2009).
Biology
Quantitative Biology
Populations and Evolution
version 2 is the final published version that contains minor changes in response to referee comments
Scientific paper
10.1016/j.jtbi.2008.11.023
We study evolutionary game dynamics in a well-mixed populations of finite size, N. A well-mixed population means that any two individuals are equally likely to interact. In particular we consider the average abundances of two strategies, A and B, under mutation and selection. The game dynamical interaction between the two strategies is given by the 2x2 payoff matrix [(a,b), (c,d)]. It has previously been shown that A is more abundant than B, if (N-2)a+Nb>Nc+(N-2)d. This result has been derived for particular stochastic processes that operate either in the limit of asymptotically small mutation rates or in the limit of weak selection. Here we show that this result holds in fact for a wide class of stochastic birth-death processes for arbitrary mutation rate and for any intensity of selection.
Antal Tibor
Nowak Martin A.
Traulsen Arne
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