Selection of dynamical rules in spatial Prisoner's Dilemma games

Details Selection of dynamical rules in spatial Prisoner's Dilemma games Selection of dynamical rules in spatial Prisoner's Dilemma games

2009-11-03

arxiv.org/abs/0911.0661v1

EPL 87 (2009) 18007

Physics

Physics and Society

5 two-column pages, 3 figures

Scientific paper

10.1209/0295-5075/87/18007

We study co-evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma games where each player can imitate both the strategy and imitation rule from a randomly chosen neighbor with a probability dependent on the payoff difference when the player's income is collected from games with the neighbors. The players, located on the sites of a two-dimensional lattice, follow unconditional cooperation or defection and use individual strategy adoption rule described by a parameter. If the system is started from a random initial state then the present co-evolutionary rule drives the system towards a state where only one evolutionary rule remains alive even in the coexistence of cooperative and defective behaviors. The final rule is related to the optimum providing the highest level of cooperation and affected by the topology of the connectivity structure.

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