Random Topologies and the emergence of cooperation: the role of short-cuts

Details Random Topologies and the emergence of cooperation: the role of short-cuts Random Topologies and the emergence of cooperation: the role of short-cuts

2010-10-18

arxiv.org/abs/1010.3547v4

Journal of Statistical Mechanics: Theory and Experiment, P04019 (2011)

Physics

Physics and Society

Scientific paper

We study in detail the role of short-cuts in promoting the emergence of cooperation in a network of agents playing the Prisoner's Dilemma Game (PDG). We introduce a model whose topology interpolates between the one-dimensional euclidean lattice (a ring) and the complete graph by changing the value of one parameter (the probability p to add a link between two nodes not already connected in the euclidean configuration). We show that there is a region of values of p in which cooperation is largely enhanced, whilst for smaller values of p only a few cooperators are present in the final state, and for p \rightarrow 1- cooperation is totally suppressed. We present analytical arguments that provide a very plausible interpretation of the simulation results, thus unveiling the mechanism by which short-cuts contribute to promote (or suppress) cooperation.

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