Promoting cooperation in social dilemmas via simple coevolutionary rules

Details Promoting cooperation in social dilemmas via simple coevolutionary rules Promoting cooperation in social dilemmas via simple coevolutionary rules

2008-12-05

arxiv.org/abs/0812.1122v1

Eur. Phys. J. B 67 (2009) 337-344

Physics

Physics and Society

13 pages, 6 figures; accepted for publication in European Physical Journal B

Scientific paper

10.1140/epjb/e2008-00470-8

We study the evolution of cooperation in structured populations within popular models of social dilemmas, whereby simple coevolutionary rules are introduced that may enhance players abilities to enforce their strategy on the opponent. Coevolution thus here refers to an evolutionary process affecting the teaching activity of players that accompanies the evolution of their strategies. Particularly, we increase the teaching activity of a player after it has successfully reproduced, yet we do so depending on the disseminated strategy. We separately consider coevolution affecting either only the cooperators or only the defectors, and show that both options promote cooperation irrespective of the applied game. Opposite to intuitive reasoning, however, we reveal that the coevolutionary promotion of players spreading defection is, in the long run, more beneficial for cooperation than the likewise promotion of cooperators. We explain the contradictory impact of the two considered coevolutionary rules by examining the differences between resulting heterogeneities that segregate participating players, and furthermore, demonstrate that the influential individuals completely determine the final outcome of the games. Our findings are immune to changes defining the type of considered social dilemmas and highlight that the heterogeneity of players, resulting in a positive feedback mechanism, is a fundamental property promoting cooperation in groups of selfish individuals.

Affiliated with

Also associated with

No associations

Rating

Promoting cooperation in social dilemmas via simple coevolutionary rules does not yet have a rating. At this time, there are no reviews or comments for this scientific paper.

If you have personal experience with Promoting cooperation in social dilemmas via simple coevolutionary rules, we encourage you to share that experience with our LandOfFree.com community. Your opinion is very important and Promoting cooperation in social dilemmas via simple coevolutionary rules will most certainly appreciate the feedback.

Rate now

Comments { 0 }

Profile ID: LFWR-SCP-O-365544