Prisoner's Dilemma: non-trivial results for the lowest temptation level in the Darwinian and Pavlovian evolutionary strategies

Details Prisoner's Dilemma: non-trivial results for the lowest temptation level in the Darwinian and Pavlovian evolutionary strategies Prisoner's Dilemma: non-trivial results for the lowest temptation level in the Darwinian and Pavlovian evolutionary strategies

2009-04-03

arxiv.org/abs/0904.0490v1

Physics

Physics and Society

5 pages, 2 color figures, submitted to EPJB

Scientific paper

The lowest temptation level (T = 1) is considered a trivial case for the Prisoner's Dilemma. Here, we show that this statement is true only for a very particular case, where the players interact with only one player. Otherwise, if the players interact with more than one player, the system presents the same possible behaviors observed for $T > 1$. In the steady state, the system can reach the cooperative, chaotic or defective phases, when adopting the Darwinian Evolutionary Strategy and the cooperative or quasi-regular phases, adopting the Pavlovian Evolutionary Strategy.

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