Merger Dynamics in Three-Agent Games

Details Merger Dynamics in Three-Agent Games Merger Dynamics in Three-Agent Games

2010-11-02

arxiv.org/abs/1011.0534v1

Eur. Phys. J. B 83, 289 - 299, 2011

Physics

Physics and Society

Scientific paper

10.1140/epjb/e2011-20326-4

We present the effect of mergers in the dynamics of the three-agent model studied by Ben-Naim, Kahng and Kim and by Rador and Mungan. Mergers are possible in three-agent games because two agents can combine forces against the third player and thus increase their probability to win a competition. We implement mergers in this three-agent model via resolving merger and no-merger units of competition in terms of a two-agent unit. This way one needs only a single parameter which we have called the competitiveness parameter. We have presented an analytical solution in the fully competitive limit. In this limit the score distribution of agents is stratified and self-similar.

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