Insecurity of position-based quantum cryptography protocols against entanglement attacks

Details Insecurity of position-based quantum cryptography protocols against entanglement attacks Insecurity of position-based quantum cryptography protocols against entanglement attacks

2010-09-12

arxiv.org/abs/1009.2256v3

Physics

Quantum Physics

Scientific paper

10.1103/PhysRevA.83.012322

Recently, position-based quantum cryptography has been claimed to be unconditionally secure. In contrary, here we show that the existing proposals for position-based quantum cryptography are, in fact, insecure if entanglement is shared among two adversaries. Specifically, we demonstrate how the adversaries can incorporate ideas of quantum teleportation and quantum secret sharing to compromise the security with certainty. The common flaw to all current protocols is that the Pauli operators always map a codeword to a codeword (up to an irrelevant overall phase). We propose a modified scheme lacking this property in which the same cheating strategy used to undermine the previous protocols can succeed with a rate at most 85%. We conjecture that the modified protocol is unconditionally secure and prove this to be true when the shared quantum resource between the adversaries is a two- or three- level system.

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