Fixation and escape times in stochastic game learning

Details Fixation and escape times in stochastic game learning Fixation and escape times in stochastic game learning

2011-02-04

arxiv.org/abs/1102.0876v1

Physics

Physics and Society

19 pages, 9 figures

Scientific paper

Evolutionary dynamics in finite populations is known to fixate eventually in the absence of mutation. We here show that a similar phenomenon can be found in stochastic game dynamical batch learning, and investigate fixation in learning processes in a simple 2x2 game, for two-player games with cyclic interaction, and in the context of the best-shot network game. The analogues of finite populations in evolution are here finite batches of observations between strategy updates. We study when and how such fixation can occur, and present results on the average time-to-fixation from numerical simulations. Simple cases are also amenable to analytical approaches and we provide estimates of the behaviour of so-called escape times as a function of the batch size. The differences and similarities with escape and fixation in evolutionary dynamics are discussed.

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