Physics – Physics and Society
Scientific paper
2009-02-09
Physics
Physics and Society
20 pages, 8 figures; to appear on BioSystems
Scientific paper
10.1016/j.biosystems.2009.02.002
The commonly used accumulated payoff scheme is not invariant with respect to shifts of payoff values when applied locally in degree-inhomogeneous population structures. We propose a suitably modified payoff scheme and we show both formally and by numerical simulation, that it leaves the replicator dynamics invariant with respect to affine transformations of the game payoff matrix. We then show empirically that, using the modified payoff scheme, an interesting amount of cooperation can be reached in three paradigmatic non-cooperative two-person games in populations that are structured according to graphs that have a marked degree inhomogeneity, similar to actual graphs found in society. The three games are the Prisoner's Dilemma, the Hawks-Doves and the Stag-Hunt. This confirms previous important observations that, under certain conditions, cooperation may emerge in such network-structured populations, even though standard replicator dynamics for mixing populations prescribes equilibria in which cooperation is totally absent in the Prisoner's Dilemma, and it is less widespread in the other two games.
Luthi Leslie
Pestelacci Enea
Tomassini Marco
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