Evolutionary game dynamics with three strategies in finite populations

Details Evolutionary game dynamics with three strategies in finite populations Evolutionary game dynamics with three strategies in finite populations

2007-01-29

arxiv.org/abs/physics/0701315v1

Physics

Physics and Society

Fixation probability calculation for 3-player games

Scientific paper

We propose a model for evolutionary game dynamics with three strategies $A$, $B$ and $C$ in the framework of Moran process in finite populations. The model can be described as a stochastic process which can be numerically computed from a system of linear equations. Furthermore, to capture the feature of the evolutionary process, we define two essential variables, the {\em global} and the {\em local} fixation probability. If the {\em global} fixation probability of strategy $A$ exceeds the neutral fixation probability, the selection favors $A$ replacing $B$ or $C$ no matter what the initial ratio of $B$ to $C$ is. Similarly, if the {\em local} fixation probability of $A$ exceeds the neutral one, the selection favors $A$ replacing $B$ or $C$ only in some appropriate initial ratios of $B$ to $C$. Besides, using our model, the famous game with AllC, AllD and TFT is analyzed. Meanwhile, we find that a single individual TFT could invade the entire population under proper conditions.

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