Evolution of cooperation is a robust outcome in the prisoner's dilemma on dynamic networks

Details Evolution of cooperation is a robust outcome in the prisoner's dilemma on dynamic networks Evolution of cooperation is a robust outcome in the prisoner's dilemma on dynamic networks

2010-06-30

arxiv.org/abs/1006.5791v2

Physics

Physics and Society

presented in domestic workshop in Japan

Scientific paper

Dynamics of evolutionary games strongly depend on underlying networks. We study the coevolutionary prisoner's dilemma in which players change their local networks as well as strategies (i.e., cooperate or defect). This topic has been increasingly explored by many researchers. On the basis of active linking dynamics [J. M. Pacheco et al., J. Theor. Biol. 243, 437 (2006), J. M. Pacheco et al., Phys. Rev. Lett. 97, 258103 (2006)], we show that cooperation is enhanced fairly robustly. In particular, cooperation evolves when the payoff of the player is normalized by the number of neighbors; this is not the case in the evolutionary prisoner's dilemma on static networks.

Affiliated with

Also associated with

No associations

Rating

Evolution of cooperation is a robust outcome in the prisoner's dilemma on dynamic networks does not yet have a rating. At this time, there are no reviews or comments for this scientific paper.

If you have personal experience with Evolution of cooperation is a robust outcome in the prisoner's dilemma on dynamic networks, we encourage you to share that experience with our LandOfFree.com community. Your opinion is very important and Evolution of cooperation is a robust outcome in the prisoner's dilemma on dynamic networks will most certainly appreciate the feedback.

Rate now

Comments { 0 }

Profile ID: LFWR-SCP-O-153596