Double-dealing behavior potentially promotes cooperation in evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games

Details Double-dealing behavior potentially promotes cooperation in evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games Double-dealing behavior potentially promotes cooperation in evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games

Nov 2010

adsabs.harvard.edu/cgi-bin/nph-data_query?bibcode=2010njph...12k3015d&link_type=abstract

New Journal of Physics, Volume 12, Issue 11, pp. 113015 (2010).

Physics

4

Scientific paper

We investigate the effects of double-dealing behavior on cooperation in evolutionary games. Each individual in a population has two attributes: character and action. One's action may be consistent with one's character or not. We provide analytical results by a mean-field description of evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games (PDGs). Moreover, we give numerical results on different networks, ranging from square lattices to scale-free networks (SFNs). Two important conclusions have been drawn from the results on SFNs. Firstly, if only non-influential individuals (those with low degrees) have chances of becoming double-dealers, cooperation is certain to deteriorate. Secondly, when influential individuals (those with high degrees) adopt double-dealing behavior moderately, cooperation would be enhanced, which is in opposition to the traditional belief. These results help us to understand better the social phenomenon of the existence of double-dealers. In addition to the PDG, other types of games including the snowdrift game, the stag-hunt game and the harmony game have also been studied on our model. The results for these three games are also presented, which are consistent with the results for the PDG qualitatively. Furthermore, we consider our model under the co-evolution framework, in which the probability of an individual changing into a double-dealer and the individual strategy both could evolve during the evolutionary process.

Affiliated with

Also associated with

No associations

Rating

Double-dealing behavior potentially promotes cooperation in evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games does not yet have a rating. At this time, there are no reviews or comments for this scientific paper.

If you have personal experience with Double-dealing behavior potentially promotes cooperation in evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games, we encourage you to share that experience with our LandOfFree.com community. Your opinion is very important and Double-dealing behavior potentially promotes cooperation in evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games will most certainly appreciate the feedback.

Rate now

Comments { 0 }

Profile ID: LFWR-SCP-O-1532635