Physics – Physics and Society
Scientific paper
2010-01-09
Physics
Physics and Society
Scientific paper
Here we study the effects of adopting different strategies against different opponent instead of adopting the same strategy against all of them in the prisoner dilemma structured in well-mixed populations. We consider an evolutionary process in which strategies that provide reproductive success are imitated and players replace one of their worst interactions by the new one. We set individuals in a well-mixed population so that network reciprocity effect is excluded and we analyze both synchronous and asynchronous updates. As a consequence of the replacement rule, we show that mutual cooperation is never destroyed and the initial fraction of mutual cooperation is a lower bound for the level of cooperation. We show by simulation and mean-field analysis that for synchronous update cooperation dominates while for asynchronous update only cooperations associated to the initial mutual cooperations are maintained. As a side effect of the replacement rule, an "implicit punishment" mechanism comes up in a way that exploitations are always neutralized providing evolutionary stability for cooperation.
da Silva Jafferson Kamphorst Leal
Wardil Lucas
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