Copeland Voting Fully Resists Constructive Control

Details Copeland Voting Fully Resists Constructive Control Copeland Voting Fully Resists Constructive Control

2007-11-29

arxiv.org/abs/0711.4759v2

Computer Science

Computer Science and Game Theory

15 pages, 1 table, 0 figures

Scientific paper

Control and bribery are settings in which an external agent seeks to influence the outcome of an election. Faliszewski et al. [FHHR07] proved that Llull voting (which is here denoted by Copeland^1) and a variant (here denoted by Copeland^0) of Copeland voting are computationally resistant to many, yet not all, types of constructive control and that they also provide broad resistance to bribery. We study a parameterized version of Copeland voting, denoted by Copeland^alpha where the parameter alpha is a rational number between 0 and 1 that specifies how ties are valued in the pairwise comparisons of candidates in Copeland elections. We establish resistance or vulnerability results, in every previously studied control scenario, for Copeland^alpha, for each rational alpha, 0

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