Physics – Physics and Society
Scientific paper
2009-06-11
Physics
Physics and Society
14 pages, 11 figures
Scientific paper
10.1103/PhysRevE.80.016110
We study the effects of conformity, the tendency of humans to imitate locally common behaviors, in the evolution of cooperation when individuals occupy the vertices of a graph and engage in the one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma or the Snowdrift game with their neighbors. Two different graphs are studied: rings (one-dimensional lattices with cyclic boundary conditions) and scale-free networks of the Barabasi-Albert type. The proposed evolutionary-graph model is studied both by means of Monte Carlo simulations and an extended pair-approximation technique. We find improved levels of cooperation when evolution is carried on rings and individuals imitate according to both the traditional pay-off bias and a conformist bias. More important, we show that scale-free networks are no longer powerful amplifiers of cooperation when fair amounts of conformity are introduced in the imitation rules of the players. Such weakening of the cooperation-promoting abilities of scale-free networks is the result of a less biased flow of information in scale-free topologies, making hubs more susceptible of being influenced by less-connected neighbors.
Pena Jorge
Pestelacci Enea
Tomassini Marco
Volken Henri
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