Physics – Physics and Society
Scientific paper
2011-10-03
Phys. Rev. E 84 (2011) 046106
Physics
Physics and Society
10 two-column pages, 12 figures; accepted for publication in Physical Review E
Scientific paper
10.1103/PhysRevE.84.046106
We have studied the evolution of strategies in spatial public goods games where both individual (peer) and institutional (pool) punishments are present beside unconditional defector and cooperator strategies. The evolution of strategy distribution is governed by imitation based on random sequential comparison of neighbors' payoff for a fixed level of noise. Using numerical simulations we have evaluated the strategy frequencies and phase diagrams when varying the synergy factor, punishment cost, and fine. Our attention is focused on two extreme cases describing all the relevant behaviors in such a complex system. According to our numerical data peer punishers prevail and control the system behavior in a large segments of parameters while pool punishers can only survive in the limit of weak peer punishment when a rich variety of solutions is observed. Paradoxically, the two types of punishment may extinguish each other's impact resulting in the triumph of defectors. The technical difficulties and suggested methods are briefly discussed.
Czako Lilla
Szabo Gyorgy
Szolnoki Attila
No associations
LandOfFree
Competition of individual and institutional punishments in spatial public goods games does not yet have a rating. At this time, there are no reviews or comments for this scientific paper.
If you have personal experience with Competition of individual and institutional punishments in spatial public goods games, we encourage you to share that experience with our LandOfFree.com community. Your opinion is very important and Competition of individual and institutional punishments in spatial public goods games will most certainly appreciate the feedback.
Profile ID: LFWR-SCP-O-271248