Comment on "Security analysis and improvements of arbitrated quantum signature schemes"

Details Comment on "Security analysis and improvements of arbitrated quantum signature schemes" Comment on "Security analysis and improvements of arbitrated quantum signature schemes"

2011-09-08

arxiv.org/abs/1109.1744v2

Physics

Quantum Physics

arXiv admin note: substantial text overlap with arXiv:1105.1232

Scientific paper

Recently, Zou et al. [Phys. Rev. A 82, 042325 (2010)] demonstrated that two arbitrated quantum signature (AQS) schemes are not secure, because an arbitrator cannot arbitrate the dispute between two users when a receiver repudiates the integrity of a signature. By using a public board, Zou et al. proposed two AQS schemes to solve the problem. This work shows that the same security problem may exist in Zou et al.'s schemes. Moreover, a malicious verifier, Bob, can actively negate a signed order if he wants to. This attack, a special case of denial-of-service (DoS) attack mentioned in [Phys. Rev. Lett. 91, 109801 (2003)], is important in quantum cryptography. Bob may get some benefits with this DoS attack, since he can actively deny Alice's signed order without being detected. This work also shows that a malicious signer can reveal the verifier's secret key without being detected by using Trojan-horse attacks.

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