Physics – Physics and Society
Scientific paper
2007-08-28
Physics
Physics and Society
11 pages, 6 figures
Scientific paper
We study an evolutionary game of chance in which the probabilities for different outcomes (e.g., heads or tails) depend on the amount wagered on those outcomes. The game is perhaps the simplest possible probabilistic game in which perception affects reality. By varying the `reality map', which relates the amount wagered to the probability of the outcome, it is possible to move continuously from a purely objective game in which probabilities have no dependence on wagers, to a purely subjective game in which probabilities equal the amount wagered. The reality map can reflect self-reinforcing strategies or self-defeating strategies. In self-reinforcing games, rational players can achieve increasing returns and manipulate the outcome probabilities to their advantage; consequently, an early lead in the game, whether acquired by chance or by strategy, typically gives a persistent advantage. We investigate the game both in and out of equilibrium and with and without rational players. We introduce a method of measuring the inefficiency of the game and show that in the large time limit the inefficiency decreases slowly in its approach to equilibrium as a power law with an exponent between zero and one, depending on the subjectivity of the game.
Cherkashin Dmitriy
Farmer Doyne J.
Lloyd Seth
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