- LandOfFree
- Scientists
- Physics
- Physics and Society
Details
A Condition for Cooperation in a Game on Complex Networks
A Condition for Cooperation in a Game on Complex Networks
- Publishing date
2010-02-27
- URL
-
arxiv.org/abs/1003.0088v4
- Journals
Journal of Theoretical Biology, 269(1): 224 - 233, 2011
- Science
Physics
- Field
Physics and Society
- Type
Scientific paper
- Digital Object Identifier
10.1016/j.jtbi.2010.10.033
- Abstract
We study a condition of favoring cooperation in a Prisoner's Dilemma game on complex networks. There are two kinds of players: cooperators and defectors. Cooperators pay a benefit b to their neighbors at a cost c, whereas defectors only receive a benefit. The game is a death-birth process with weak selection. Although it has been widely thought that b/c> is a condition of favoring cooperation, we find that b/c> is the condition. We also show that among three representative networks, namely, regular, random, and scale-free, a regular network favors cooperation the most whereas a scale-free network favors cooperation the least. In an ideal scale-free network, cooperation is never realized. Whether or not the scale-free network and network heterogeneity favor cooperation depends on the details of the game, although it is occasionally believed that these favor cooperation irrespective of the game structure.
Affiliated with
Also associated with
No associations
LandOfFree
Say what you really think
Search LandOfFree.com for scientists and scientific papers. Rate them and share your experience with other people.
Rating
A Condition for Cooperation in a Game on Complex Networks does not yet have a rating.
At this time, there are no reviews or comments for this scientific paper.
If you have personal experience with A Condition for Cooperation in a Game on Complex Networks, we encourage you to share that experience with our LandOfFree.com community.
Your opinion is very important and A Condition for Cooperation in a Game on Complex Networks will most certainly appreciate the feedback.
Rate now
Profile ID: LFWR-SCP-O-629560
All data on this website is collected from public sources.
Our data reflects the most accurate information available at the time of publication.