Improving the security of multiparty quantum secret sharing against Trojan horse attack

Physics – Quantum Physics

Scientific paper

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4 pages, 2 figures; The revised version of the paper published in Phys. Rev. A 72, 044302 (2005). A bug is modified and an add

Scientific paper

10.1103/PhysRevA.72.044302

We analyzed the security of the multiparty quantum secret sharing (MQSS) protocol recently proposed by Zhang, Li and Man [Phys. Rev. A \textbf{71}, 044301 (2005)] and found that this protocol is secure for any other eavesdropper except for the agent Bob who prepares the quantum signals as he can attack the quantum communication with a Trojan horse. That is, Bob replaces the single-photon signal with a multi-photon one and the other agent Charlie cannot find this cheating as she does not measure the photons before they runs back from the boss Alice, which reveals that this MQSS protocol is not secure for Bob. Finally, we present a possible improvement of the MQSS protocol security with two single-photon measurements and six unitary operations.

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