Stability of mixed Nash equilibria in symmetric quantum games

Details Stability of mixed Nash equilibria in symmetric quantum games Stability of mixed Nash equilibria in symmetric quantum games

2001-06-09

arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0106056v4

Communications in Theoretical Physics. Vol. 42, No. 3, pp 335-338, 2004

Physics

Quantum Physics

8 pages, no figure, to appear in Communications in Theoretical Physics

Scientific paper

In bi-matrix games the Bishop-Cannings theorem of the classical evolutionary
game theory does not permit pure evolutionarily stable strategies (ESSs) when a
mixed ESS exists. We find the necessary form of two-qubit initial quantum
states when a switch-over to a quantum version of the game also changes the
evolutionary stability of a mixed symmetric Nash equilibrium.

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