Postquantum eavesdropping without superluminal signaling

Details Postquantum eavesdropping without superluminal signaling Postquantum eavesdropping without superluminal signaling

2005-07-11

arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0507100v1

Physics

Quantum Physics

Scientific paper

In a recent Letter (Phys. Rev. Lett. 95 (2005) 010503) Barrett, Hardy and Kent (BHK) considered a very interesting question which of the fundamental laws of physics ensure security of quantum cryptographic protocols. In particular, they presented quantum key distribution protocol and claimed its security in a very general framework, which allows - what they call - postquantum eavesdropping strategies i.e. which "allows for eavesdroppers who can break the laws of quantum mechanics, as long as nothing they can do implies the possibility of superluminal signaling". In this Comment, however, we show that it is still possible to construct a strategy, which although consistent with all asumptions explicitely stated in BHK paper, enables perfect eavesdropping in their protocol.

Affiliated with

Also associated with

No associations

Rating

Postquantum eavesdropping without superluminal signaling does not yet have a rating. At this time, there are no reviews or comments for this scientific paper.

If you have personal experience with Postquantum eavesdropping without superluminal signaling, we encourage you to share that experience with our LandOfFree.com community. Your opinion is very important and Postquantum eavesdropping without superluminal signaling will most certainly appreciate the feedback.

Rate now

Comments { 0 }

Profile ID: LFWR-SCP-O-404833