Dynamical instabilities in a simple minority game with discounting

Details Dynamical instabilities in a simple minority game with discounting Dynamical instabilities in a simple minority game with discounting

2008-02-07

arxiv.org/abs/0802.1054v1

Physics

Physics and Society

8 pages

Scientific paper

10.1088/1742-5468/2008/04/L04004

We explore the effect of discounting and experimentation in a simple model of interacting adaptive agents. Agents belong to either of two types and each has to decide whether to participate a game or not, the game being profitable when there is an excess of players of the other type. We find the emergence of large fluctuations as a result of the onset of a dynamical instability which may arise discontinuously (increasing the discount factor) or continuously (decreasing the experimentation rate). The phase diagram is characterized in detail and noise amplification close to a bifurcation point is identified as the physical mechanism behind the instability.

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