Non-factorizable Joint Probabilities and Evolutionarily Stable Strategies in the Quantum Prisoner's Dilemma Game

Details Non-factorizable Joint Probabilities and Evolutionarily Stable Strategies in the Quantum Prisoner's Dilemma Game Non-factorizable Joint Probabilities and Evolutionarily Stable Strategies in the Quantum Prisoner's Dilemma Game

2009-02-17

arxiv.org/abs/0902.2889v2

Physics Letters A 373 (2009) 2537--2541

Physics

Quantum Physics

9 pages, no figure

Scientific paper

The well known refinement of the Nash Equilibrium (NE) called an Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ESS) is investigated in the quantum Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) game that is played using an Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen type setting. Earlier results report that in this scheme the classical NE remains intact as the unique solution of the quantum PD game. In contrast, we show here that interestingly in this scheme a non-classical solution for the ESS emerges for the quantum PD.

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