Stable matching in a common generalization of the marriage and assignment models

Details Stable matching in a common generalization of the marriage and assignment models Stable matching in a common generalization of the marriage and assignment models

1998-01-21

arxiv.org/abs/math/9801096v1

Mathematics

Combinatorics

21 pages

Scientific paper

In the theory of two-sided matching markets there are two well-known models: the marriage model (where no money is involved) and the assignment model (where payments are involved). Roth and Sotomayor (1990) asked for an explanation for the similarities in behavior between those two models. We address this question by introducing a common generalization that preserves the two important features: the existence of a stable outcome and the lattice property of the set of stable outcomes.

Affiliated with

Also associated with

No associations

Rating

Stable matching in a common generalization of the marriage and assignment models does not yet have a rating. At this time, there are no reviews or comments for this scientific paper.

If you have personal experience with Stable matching in a common generalization of the marriage and assignment models, we encourage you to share that experience with our LandOfFree.com community. Your opinion is very important and Stable matching in a common generalization of the marriage and assignment models will most certainly appreciate the feedback.

Rate now

Comments { 0 }

Profile ID: LFWR-SCP-O-689920