Auctions with Severely Bounded Communication

Details Auctions with Severely Bounded Communication Auctions with Severely Bounded Communication

2011-10-12

arxiv.org/abs/1110.2733v1

Journal Of Artificial Intelligence Research, Volume 28, pages 233-266, 2007

Computer Science

Computer Science and Game Theory

Scientific paper

10.1613/jair.2081

We study auctions with severe bounds on the communication allowed: each bidder may only transmit t bits of information to the auctioneer. We consider both welfare- and profit-maximizing auctions under this communication restriction. For both measures, we determine the optimal auction and show that the loss incurred relative to unconstrained auctions is mild. We prove non-surprising properties of these kinds of auctions, e.g., that in optimal mechanisms bidders simply report the interval in which their valuation lies in, as well as some surprising properties, e.g., that asymmetric auctions are better than symmetric ones and that multi-round auctions reduce the communication complexity only by a linear factor.

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