Computer Science – Computer Science and Game Theory
Scientific paper
2011-05-11
Computer Science
Computer Science and Game Theory
Scientific paper
The Shapley value is one of the most important solution concepts in cooperative game theory. In coalitional games without externalities, it allows to compute a unique payoff division that meets certain desirable fairness axioms. However, in many realistic applications where externalities are present, Shapley's axioms fail to indicate such a unique division. Consequently, there are many extensions of Shapley value to the environment with externalities proposed in the literature built upon additional axioms. Two important such extensions are "externality-free" value by Pham Do and Norde and value that "absorbed all externalities" by McQuillin. They are good reference points in a space of potential payoff divisions for coalitional games with externalities as they limit the space at two opposite extremes. In a recent, important publication, De Clippel and Serrano presented a marginality-based axiomatization of the value by Pham Do Norde. In this paper, we propose a dual approach to marginality which allows us to derive the value of McQuillin. Thus, we close the picture outlined by De Clippel and Serrano.
No associations
LandOfFree
Steady Marginality: A Uniform Approach to Shapley Value for Games with Externalities does not yet have a rating. At this time, there are no reviews or comments for this scientific paper.
If you have personal experience with Steady Marginality: A Uniform Approach to Shapley Value for Games with Externalities, we encourage you to share that experience with our LandOfFree.com community. Your opinion is very important and Steady Marginality: A Uniform Approach to Shapley Value for Games with Externalities will most certainly appreciate the feedback.
Profile ID: LFWR-SCP-O-611841