Intelligent tit-for-tat in the iterated prisoner's dilemma game

Details Intelligent tit-for-tat in the iterated prisoner's dilemma game Intelligent tit-for-tat in the iterated prisoner's dilemma game

2008-07-14

arxiv.org/abs/0807.2105v2

Physical Review E 78, 011125 (2008)

Biology

Quantitative Biology

Populations and Evolution

9 pages, 14 figures

Scientific paper

10.1103/PhysRevE.78.011125

We seek a route to the equilibrium where all the agents cooperate in the iterated prisoner's dilemma game on a two-dimensional plane, focusing on the role of tit-for-tat strategy. When a time horizon, within which a strategy can recall the past, is one time step, an equilibrium can be achieved as cooperating strategies dominate the whole population via proliferation of tit-for-tat. Extending the time horizon, we filter out poor strategies by simplified replicator dynamics and observe a similar evolutionary pattern to reach the cooperating equilibrium. In particular, the rise of a modified tit-for-tat strategy plays a central role, which implies how a robust strategy is adopted when provided with an enhanced memory capacity.

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