Philosophy and the practice of Bayesian statistics

Details Philosophy and the practice of Bayesian statistics Philosophy and the practice of Bayesian statistics

2010-06-19

arxiv.org/abs/1006.3868v4

Mathematics

Statistics Theory

36 pages, 5 figures. v2: Fixed typo in caption of figure 1. v3: Further typo fixes. v4: Revised in response to referees

Scientific paper

A substantial school in the philosophy of science identifies Bayesian inference with inductive inference and even rationality as such, and seems to be strengthened by the rise and practical success of Bayesian statistics. We argue that the most successful forms of Bayesian statistics do not actually support that particular philosophy but rather accord much better with sophisticated forms of hypothetico-deductivism. We examine the actual role played by prior distributions in Bayesian models, and the crucial aspects of model checking and model revision, which fall outside the scope of Bayesian confirmation theory. We draw on the literature on the consistency of Bayesian updating and also on our experience of applied work in social science. Clarity about these matters should benefit not just philosophy of science, but also statistical practice. At best, the inductivist view has encouraged researchers to fit and compare models without checking them; at worst, theorists have actively discouraged practitioners from performing model checking because it does not fit into their framework.

Affiliated with

Also associated with

No associations

Rating

Philosophy and the practice of Bayesian statistics does not yet have a rating. At this time, there are no reviews or comments for this scientific paper.

If you have personal experience with Philosophy and the practice of Bayesian statistics, we encourage you to share that experience with our LandOfFree.com community. Your opinion is very important and Philosophy and the practice of Bayesian statistics will most certainly appreciate the feedback.

Rate now

Comments { 0 }

Profile ID: LFWR-SCP-O-431601