The Price of Selfish Stackelberg Leadership in a Network Game

Details The Price of Selfish Stackelberg Leadership in a Network Game The Price of Selfish Stackelberg Leadership in a Network Game

2007-11-08

arxiv.org/abs/0711.1242v1

Computer Science

Computer Science and Game Theory

18 pages, 1 figure

Scientific paper

We study a class of games in which a finite number of agents each controls a quantity of flow to be routed through a network, and are able to split their own flow between multiple paths through the network. Recent work on this model has contrasted the social cost of Nash equilibria with the best possible social cost. Here we show that additional costs are incurred in situations where a selfish ``leader'' agent allocates his flow, and then commits to that choice so that other agents are compelled to minimise their own cost based on the first agent's choice. We find that even in simple networks, the leader can often improve his own cost at the expense of increased social cost. Focusing on the 2-player case, we give upper and lower bounds on the worst-case additional cost incurred.

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