On the Base Station Selection and Base Station Sharing in Self-Configuring Networks

Computer Science – Computer Science and Game Theory

Scientific paper

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3rd ICST/ACM International Workshop on Game Theory in Communication Networks. October 23th 2009. Pisa, Italy

Scientific paper

We model the interaction of several radio devices aiming to obtain wireless connectivity by using a set of base stations (BS) as a non-cooperative game. Each radio device aims to maximize its own spectral efficiency (SE) in two different scenarios: First, we let each player to use a unique BS (BS selection) and second, we let them to simultaneously use several BSs (BS Sharing). In both cases, we show that the resulting game is an exact potential game. We found that the BS selection game posses multiple Nash equilibria (NE) while the BS sharing game posses a unique one. We provide fully decentralized algorithms which always converge to a NE in both games. We analyze the price of anarchy and the price of stability for the case of BS selection. Finally, we observed that depending on the number of transmitters, the BS selection technique might provide a better global performance (network spectral efficiency) than BS sharing, which suggests the existence of a Braess type paradox.

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