On the performance of approximate equilibria in congestion games

Details On the performance of approximate equilibria in congestion games On the performance of approximate equilibria in congestion games

2008-04-21

arxiv.org/abs/0804.3160v2

Computer Science

Computer Science and Game Theory

Scientific paper

We study the performance of approximate Nash equilibria for linear congestion games. We consider how much the price of anarchy worsens and how much the price of stability improves as a function of the approximation factor $\epsilon$. We give (almost) tight upper and lower bounds for both the price of anarchy and the price of stability for atomic and non-atomic congestion games. Our results not only encompass and generalize the existing results of exact equilibria to $\epsilon$-Nash equilibria, but they also provide a unified approach which reveals the common threads of the atomic and non-atomic price of anarchy results. By expanding the spectrum, we also cast the existing results in a new light. For example, the Pigou network, which gives tight results for exact Nash equilibria of selfish routing, remains tight for the price of stability of $\epsilon$-Nash equilibria but not for the price of anarchy.

Affiliated with

Also associated with

No associations

Rating

On the performance of approximate equilibria in congestion games does not yet have a rating. At this time, there are no reviews or comments for this scientific paper.

If you have personal experience with On the performance of approximate equilibria in congestion games, we encourage you to share that experience with our LandOfFree.com community. Your opinion is very important and On the performance of approximate equilibria in congestion games will most certainly appreciate the feedback.

Rate now

Comments { 0 }

Profile ID: LFWR-SCP-O-35929