Parameterized Control Complexity in Fallback Voting

Details Parameterized Control Complexity in Fallback Voting Parameterized Control Complexity in Fallback Voting

2010-04-21

arxiv.org/abs/1004.3659v1

Computer Science

Computational Complexity

13 pages

Scientific paper

We study the parameterized control complexity of fallback voting, a voting system that combines preference-based with approval voting. Electoral control is one of many different ways for an external agent to tamper with the outcome of an election. We show that adding and deleting candidates in fallback voting are W[2]-hard for both the constructive and destructive case, parameterized by the amount of action taken by the external agent. Furthermore, we show that adding and deleting voters in fallback voting are W[2]-hard for the constructive case, parameterized by the amount of action taken by the external agent, and are in FPT for the destructive case.

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