Structure of Extreme Correlated Equilibria: a Zero-Sum Example and its Implications

Details Structure of Extreme Correlated Equilibria: a Zero-Sum Example and its Implications Structure of Extreme Correlated Equilibria: a Zero-Sum Example and its Implications

2010-01-30

arxiv.org/abs/1002.0035v2

International Journal of Game Theory, Volume 40, Number 4, 749-767, 2011

Computer Science

Computer Science and Game Theory

Scientific paper

10.1007/s00182-010-0267-1

We exhibit the rich structure of the set of correlated equilibria by analyzing the simplest of polynomial games: the mixed extension of matching pennies. We show that while the correlated equilibrium set is convex and compact, the structure of its extreme points can be quite complicated. In finite games the ratio of extreme correlated to extreme Nash equilibria can be greater than exponential in the size of the strategy spaces. In polynomial games there can exist extreme correlated equilibria which are not finitely supported; we construct a large family of examples using techniques from ergodic theory. We show that in general the set of correlated equilibrium distributions of a polynomial game cannot be described by conditions on finitely many moments (means, covariances, etc.), in marked contrast to the set of Nash equilibria which is always expressible in terms of finitely many moments.

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