Analysis of Equilibria and Strategic Interaction in Complex Networks

Computer Science – Computer Science and Game Theory

Scientific paper

Rate now

  [ 0.00 ] – not rated yet Voters 0   Comments 0

Details

7 pages, 3 figures. Related papers, data and software at http://alum.mit.edu/www/vmp

Scientific paper

This paper studies $n$-person simultaneous-move games with linear best response function, where individuals interact within a given network structure. This class of games have been used to model various settings, such as, public goods, belief formation, peer effects, and oligopoly. The purpose of this paper is to study the effect of the network structure on Nash equilibrium outcomes of this class of games. Bramoull\'{e} et al. derived conditions for uniqueness and stability of a Nash equilibrium in terms of the smallest eigenvalue of the adjacency matrix representing the network of interactions. Motivated by this result, we study how local structural properties of the network of interactions affect this eigenvalue, influencing game equilibria. In particular, we use algebraic graph theory and convex optimization to derive new bounds on the smallest eigenvalue in terms of the distribution of degrees, cycles, and other relevant substructures. We illustrate our results with numerical simulations involving online social networks.

No associations

LandOfFree

Say what you really think

Search LandOfFree.com for scientists and scientific papers. Rate them and share your experience with other people.

Rating

Analysis of Equilibria and Strategic Interaction in Complex Networks does not yet have a rating. At this time, there are no reviews or comments for this scientific paper.

If you have personal experience with Analysis of Equilibria and Strategic Interaction in Complex Networks, we encourage you to share that experience with our LandOfFree.com community. Your opinion is very important and Analysis of Equilibria and Strategic Interaction in Complex Networks will most certainly appreciate the feedback.

Rate now

     

Profile ID: LFWR-SCP-O-223835

  Search
All data on this website is collected from public sources. Our data reflects the most accurate information available at the time of publication.