Using Lotteries to Approximate the Optimal Revenue

Details Using Lotteries to Approximate the Optimal Revenue Using Lotteries to Approximate the Optimal Revenue

2011-10-10

arxiv.org/abs/1110.1980v1

Computer Science

Computer Science and Game Theory

Scientific paper

There has been much recent work on the revenue-raising properties of truthful mechanisms for selling goods. Typically the revenue of a mechanism is compared against a "benchmark" (such as, the maximum revenue obtainable by an omniscient seller selling at a fixed price to at least two customers), with a view to understanding how much lower the mechanism's revenue is than the benchmark, in the worst case. Here we study this issue in the context of {\em lotteries}, where the seller may sell a probability of winning the item. We are interested in two general issues. Firstly, we aim at using the true optimum revenue as benchmark for our auctions. Secondly, we study the extent to which the additional expressive power resulting from lotteries, helps to improve the worst-case ratio. We study this in the well-known context of {\em digital goods}, where the production cost is zero. We show that in this context collusion-resistant lotteries (these are lotteries for which no coalition of bidders exchanging side payments has an advantage in lying) are as powerful as truthful ones.

Affiliated with

Also associated with

No associations

Rating

Using Lotteries to Approximate the Optimal Revenue does not yet have a rating. At this time, there are no reviews or comments for this scientific paper.

If you have personal experience with Using Lotteries to Approximate the Optimal Revenue, we encourage you to share that experience with our LandOfFree.com community. Your opinion is very important and Using Lotteries to Approximate the Optimal Revenue will most certainly appreciate the feedback.

Rate now

Comments { 0 }

Profile ID: LFWR-SCP-O-146884