Transparent Anonymization: Thwarting Adversaries Who Know the Algorithm

Details Transparent Anonymization: Thwarting Adversaries Who Know the Algorithm Transparent Anonymization: Thwarting Adversaries Who Know the Algorithm

2010-03-26

arxiv.org/abs/1003.5080v1

Computer Science

Databases

To appear in the ACM Transaction on Database Systems (TODS)

Scientific paper

Numerous generalization techniques have been proposed for privacy preserving data publishing. Most existing techniques, however, implicitly assume that the adversary knows little about the anonymization algorithm adopted by the data publisher. Consequently, they cannot guard against privacy attacks that exploit various characteristics of the anonymization mechanism. This paper provides a practical solution to the above problem. First, we propose an analytical model for evaluating disclosure risks, when an adversary knows everything in the anonymization process, except the sensitive values. Based on this model, we develop a privacy principle, transparent l-diversity, which ensures privacy protection against such powerful adversaries. We identify three algorithms that achieve transparent l-diversity, and verify their effectiveness and efficiency through extensive experiments with real data.

Affiliated with

Also associated with

No associations

Rating

Transparent Anonymization: Thwarting Adversaries Who Know the Algorithm does not yet have a rating. At this time, there are no reviews or comments for this scientific paper.

If you have personal experience with Transparent Anonymization: Thwarting Adversaries Who Know the Algorithm, we encourage you to share that experience with our LandOfFree.com community. Your opinion is very important and Transparent Anonymization: Thwarting Adversaries Who Know the Algorithm will most certainly appreciate the feedback.

Rate now

Comments { 0 }

Profile ID: LFWR-SCP-O-182141