The public goods game on homogeneous and heterogeneous networks: investment strategy according to the pool size

Details The public goods game on homogeneous and heterogeneous networks: investment strategy according to the pool size The public goods game on homogeneous and heterogeneous networks: investment strategy according to the pool size

2007-08-21

arxiv.org/abs/0708.2805v1

Economy

Quantitative Finance

General Finance

6 pages, 5 figures

Scientific paper

We propose an extended public goods interaction model to study the evolution of cooperation in heterogeneous population. The investors are arranged on the well known scale-free type network, the Barab\'{a}si-Albert model. Each investor is supposed to preferentially distribute capital to pools in its portfolio based on the knowledge of pool sizes. The extent that investors prefer larger pools is determined by investment strategy denoted by a tunable parameter $\alpha$, with larger $\alpha$ corresponding to more preference to larger pools. As comparison, we also study this interaction model on square lattice, and find that the heterogeneity contacts favors cooperation. Additionally, the influence of local topology to the game dynamics under different $\alpha$ strategies are discussed. It is found that the system with smaller $\alpha$ strategy can perform comparatively better than the larger $\alpha$ ones.

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