Strategic Information Exchange

Details Strategic Information Exchange Strategic Information Exchange

2010-07-26

arxiv.org/abs/1007.4427v1

Mathematics

Probability

Scientific paper

We study a class of two-player repeated games with incomplete information and informational externalities. In these games, two states are chosen at the outset, and players get private information on the pair, before engaging in repeated play. The payoff of each player only depends on his `own' state and on his own action. We study to what extent, and how, information can be exchanged in equilibrium. We prove that provided the private information of each player is valuable for the other player, the set of sequential equilibrium payoffs converges to the set of feasible and individually rational payoffs as players become patient.

Affiliated with

Also associated with

No associations

Rating

Strategic Information Exchange does not yet have a rating. At this time, there are no reviews or comments for this scientific paper.

If you have personal experience with Strategic Information Exchange, we encourage you to share that experience with our LandOfFree.com community. Your opinion is very important and Strategic Information Exchange will most certainly appreciate the feedback.

Rate now

Comments { 0 }

Profile ID: LFWR-SCP-O-558733