Stable Outcomes for Two-Sided Contract Choice Problems

Details Stable Outcomes for Two-Sided Contract Choice Problems Stable Outcomes for Two-Sided Contract Choice Problems

2004-06-27

arxiv.org/abs/cs/0406051v1

Computer Science

Computer Science and Game Theory

13 pages; source file: MS Word

Scientific paper

We show, that a simple generalization of the Deferred Acceptance Procedure with firms proposing due to Gale and Shapley(1962), yeild outcomes for a two-sided contract choice problem, which necessarily belong to the core and are Weakly Pareto Optimal for firms. Under additional assumptions: (a) given any two distinct workers, the set of yields acheivable by a firm with the first worker is disjoint from the set of yields acheivable by it with the second, and (b) the contract choice problem is pair-wise efficient, we prove that there is no stable outcome at which a firm can get more than what it gets at the unique outcome of our procedure.

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