Stable Outcomes For Contract Choice Problems

Details Stable Outcomes For Contract Choice Problems Stable Outcomes For Contract Choice Problems

2004-01-16

arxiv.org/abs/math/0401199v1

Mathematics

Optimization and Control

14 pages

Scientific paper

In this paper, we consider the problem of choosing a set of multi-party contracts, where each coalition of agents has a non-empty finite set of contracts to choose from. We call such problems, contract choice problems. We provide conditions under which a contract choice problem has a non-empty set of "stable" outcomes. There are two types of stability concepts we study in this paper: cooperative stability and non-cooperative stability. The cooperative stability concept that we invoke here is the core. The non-cooperative stability concept that we study here is individual stability. The final result of this paper states that every contract choice problem has a non-empty weak bargaining set.

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