Stable Nash equilibria of medium access games under symmetric, socially altruistic behavior

Details Stable Nash equilibria of medium access games under symmetric, socially altruistic behavior Stable Nash equilibria of medium access games under symmetric, socially altruistic behavior

2010-03-27

arxiv.org/abs/1003.5324v2

Computer Science

Computer Science and Game Theory

Scientific paper

We consider the effects of altruistic behavior on random medium access control (slotted ALOHA) for local area communication networks. For an idealized, synchronously iterative, two-player game with asymmetric player demands, we find a Hamiltonian governing the Jacobi dynamics under purely altruistic behavior. Though the positions of the interior Nash equilibrium points do not change in the presence of altruistic behavior, the nature of their local asymptotic stability does. There is a region of partially altruistic behavior for which neither interior Nash equilibrium point is locally asymptotically stable. Also, for a power control game with a single Nash equilibrium, we show how its stability changes as a function of the altruism parameter. Variations of these altruistic game frameworks are discussed considering power (instead of throughput) based costs and linear utility functions.

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