Stability Scores: Measuring Coalitional Stability

Details Stability Scores: Measuring Coalitional Stability Stability Scores: Measuring Coalitional Stability

2011-05-30

arxiv.org/abs/1105.5983v2

Computer Science

Computer Science and Game Theory

Full version, including proofs, of a paper published in the proceedings of AAMAS 2012

Scientific paper

We introduce a measure for the level of stability against coalitional deviations, called \emph{stability scores}, which generalizes widely used notions of stability in non-cooperative games. We use the proposed measure to compare various Nash equilibria in congestion games, and to quantify the effect of game parameters on coalitional stability. For our main results, we apply stability scores to analyze and compare the Generalized Second Price (GSP) and Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) ad auctions. We show that while a central result of the ad auctions literature is that the GSP and VCG auctions implement the same outcome in one of the equilibria of GSP, the GSP outcome is far more stable. Finally, a modified version of VCG is introduced, which is group strategy-proof, and thereby achieves the highest possible stability score.

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