Sponsored Search, Market Equilibria, and the Hungarian Method

Details Sponsored Search, Market Equilibria, and the Hungarian Method Sponsored Search, Market Equilibria, and the Hungarian Method

2009-12-10

arxiv.org/abs/0912.1934v5

Computer Science

Computer Science and Game Theory

Scientific paper

Two-sided matching markets play a prominent role in economic theory. A prime example of such a market is the sponsored search market where n advertisers compete for the assignment of one of k sponsored search results, also known as "slots", for certain keywords they are interested in. Here, as in other markets of that kind, market equilibria correspond to stable matchings. In this paper, we show how to modify Kuhn's Hungarian Method (Kuhn, 1955) so that it finds an optimal stable matching between advertisers and advertising slots in settings with generalized linear utilities, per-bidder-item reserve prices, and per-bidder-item maximum prices. The only algorithm for this problem presented so far (Aggarwal et al., 2009) requires the market to be in "general position". We do not make this assumption.

Affiliated with

Also associated with

No associations

Rating

Sponsored Search, Market Equilibria, and the Hungarian Method does not yet have a rating. At this time, there are no reviews or comments for this scientific paper.

If you have personal experience with Sponsored Search, Market Equilibria, and the Hungarian Method, we encourage you to share that experience with our LandOfFree.com community. Your opinion is very important and Sponsored Search, Market Equilibria, and the Hungarian Method will most certainly appreciate the feedback.

Rate now

Comments { 0 }

Profile ID: LFWR-SCP-O-594539