Sequential pivotal mechanisms for public project problems

Details Sequential pivotal mechanisms for public project problems Sequential pivotal mechanisms for public project problems

2008-10-08

arxiv.org/abs/0810.1383v2

Computer Science

Computer Science and Game Theory

19 pages. The version without the appendix will appear in the Proc. 2nd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, 20

Scientific paper

It is well-known that for several natural decision problems no budget balanced Groves mechanisms exist. This has motivated recent research on designing variants of feasible Groves mechanisms (termed as `redistribution of VCG (Vickrey-Clarke-Groves) payments') that generate reduced deficit. With this in mind, we study sequential mechanisms and consider optimal strategies that could reduce the deficit resulting under the simultaneous mechanism. We show that such strategies exist for the sequential pivotal mechanism of the well-known public project problem. We also exhibit an optimal strategy with the property that a maximal social welfare is generated when each player follows it. Finally, we show that these strategies can be achieved by an implementation in Nash equilibrium.

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