Sequential mechanism design

Details Sequential mechanism design Sequential mechanism design

2007-05-15

arxiv.org/abs/0705.2170v1

Computer Science

Computer Science and Game Theory

28 pages

Scientific paper

In the customary VCG (Vickrey-Clarke-Groves) mechanism truth-telling is a
dominant strategy. In this paper we study the sequential VCG mechanism and show
that other dominant strategies may then exist. We illustrate how this fact can
be used to minimize taxes using examples concerned with Clarke tax and public
projects.

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