Security Games with Decision and Observation Errors

Details Security Games with Decision and Observation Errors Security Games with Decision and Observation Errors

2010-03-14

arxiv.org/abs/1003.2767v1

Computer Science

Computer Science and Game Theory

Scientific paper

We study two-player security games which can be viewed as sequences of nonzero-sum matrix games played by an Attacker and a Defender. The evolution of the game is based on a stochastic fictitious play process. Players do not have access to each other's payoff matrix. Each has to observe the other's actions up to present and plays the action generated based on the best response to these observations. However, when the game is played over a communication network, there are several practical issues that need to be taken into account: First, the players may make random decision errors from time to time. Second, the players' observations of each other's previous actions may be incorrect. The players will try to compensate for these errors based on the information they have. We examine convergence property of the game in such scenarios, and establish convergence to the equilibrium point under some mild assumptions when both players are restricted to two actions.

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